한정석 연구실

DAOs look "democratic," but big holders ("whales") can strategically buy tokens to gain voting power and push choices that benefit them privately even if they hurt the platform’s long-run value. More concentrated voting power tends to slow DAO growth, but that damage is softened when the DAO is bigger, tokens are more illiquid (harder to quickly trade for control), or governance designs like staking/vote-escrow tie whales to long-term outcomes. Fund managers may rationally pursue short-term, high-turnover strategies because they speed up "skill revelation" and can quickly boost future flows, while poor outcomes are partly cushioned by the option to exit. In equilibrium this creates sorting: newer/lower-reputation managers tilt short-term, while seasoned/high-skill managers run longer-horizon opportunities and generate most of the value added. We model heterogeneous rational bubbles that interact through competition and complementarity. A cryptocurrency portfolio benefits from diversification and a compensation effect—when some burst, survivors appreciate, offsetting losses. This suggests that fragile bubbles, such as a crypto ETF, can rival a single, more stable bubble. Informative stock prices reduce agency costs and boost firm value. However, since informed trading capital is limited, firms competing to attract informed investors by focusing on short-term projects can lead to a "short-termism trap," where excessive short-termism negates the benefits of price informativeness but from which no firm can escape. A shock that reduces efficiency increases the duration of arbitrage and diminishes available capital for new positions, potentially causing arbitrage capital to exit the market and intensifying the impact on price efficiency, resulting in a lasting shift known as